Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation - Froud v. Celotex Corp. by Pietrick, Ann Gillespie
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 32 
Issue 2 Winter 1983 Article 10 
Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation - Froud v. Celotex Corp. 
Ann Gillespie Pietrick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Ann G. Pietrick, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation - Froud v. Celotex Corp., 32 DePaul L. Rev. 457 
(1983) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol32/iss2/10 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
FROUD V. CELOTEX CORP.
James Froud, John Friday and Wyatt Williamson were asbestos workers
who allegedly contracted peritoneal mesothelioma and bronchogenic car-
cinoma from prolonged exposure to asbestos products which had been
manufactured and sold by twenty-four companies.' After filing actions against
all twenty-four companies, Froud and Friday died.2 Administrators were ap-
pointed to continue the actions on behalf of their estates. Williamson died
before bringing an action and his administrator filed an action on behalf
of his estate.3
Each complaint contained three counts against the defendants: one in
negligence, one in strict tort liability and one seeking punitive damages.'
In each action, the defendants moved to dismiss the punitive damages count
on the ground that common law actions for punitive damages abated at the
time of the death of the injured party.5 Relying on case law construing the
Illinois Survival Act,6 the trial court reluctantly granted the defendants'
motions to dismiss.7 Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal orders, arguing that
1. Peritoneal mesothelioma is a rare cancer of the peritoneum, which is the lining
of the abdomen. It has been estimated that in approximately 85% of all mesothelioma
cases, asbestos exposure will be found in the patient's past. Currently, treated or untreated
cases of mesothelioma generally result in death approximately one year from its onset. 4A
R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 205C..72 (1982). Bronchogenic carcinoma is
a form of lung cancer originating in the bronchi. 5A LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PER-
SONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES § 33.39 (rev. ed. 1972). The relationship between lung
cancer and asbestos exposure was confirmed in 1955; even short durations (of several weeks)
of exposure carry the risk of lung cancer. 4A R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
§ 205C.71 (1982).
2. The 24 companies named as defendants were: Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., Standard
Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co., Keene Corp., Grant Wilson, Inc., Armstrong Cork Co., A&M
Insulation Co., AARCO Products Corp., Mauritzon, Inc., Union Carbide Corp., Ruberoid,
Inc., Ryder Cement, Flintkote Co., H.K. Porter Co., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., Forty-
eight Insulation, Owens-Illinois, Inc., Nicolet Industries, Inc., Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Celotex
Corp., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., Combustion Engineering Corp., Fibreboard Corp., UNARCO
Industries, Inc., and Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. Froud's, Friday's, and Williamson's suits
were consolidated on appeal. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 III. App. 3d 654, 656, 437 N.E.2d
910, 911 (1st Dist. 1982), appeal granted, 91 Il. 2d 569 (1982).
3. 107 Ill. App. 3d at 656, 437 N.E.2d at 912.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110V2, § 27-6 (1981). The Illinois Survival Act provides: "In
addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following also survive: actions
. . . to recover damages for an injury to the person (except slander and libel). ... The
Survival Act thus allows personal injury actions which have accrued before the injured party's
death to be brought by the injured party's estate. For a discussion of cases involving the
Survival Act, see infra notes 11-41 and accompanying text.
7. 107 I11. App. 3d at 657, 437 N.E.2d at 912. The trial judge, Judge Elward, made the
following statement:
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the Survival Act no longer is construed as requiring the abatement of claims
for punitive damages.' Stating that the Survival Act is a "neutral vehicle"
which neither "authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages,"' the appellate
court concluded that common law actions for punitive damages survive the
death of the injured party and, accordingly, reversed the trial court's dismissal
orders.
The Froud decision overrules more than one hundred years of Illinois case
law rejecting claims for punitive damages under the Survival Act." The deci-
sion has special significance for corporate defendants facing multiple claims
in products liability actions. " To analyze the impact of the Froud decision
adequately, it is necessary to consider the history of the Survival Act. Next,
the Froud court's analysis will be examined. This examination will be followed
by a discussion of the concept of punitive damages in the products lia-
bility/mass tort situation. Finally, various proposals for the control of
punitive awards will be suggested.
The Court, therefore, will grant the motion to dismiss Count III as to punitive
damages with a great deal of reluctance and with an open invitation that the Court
has not heretofore made in any of the cases it's heard in the four and a half years
in this court; that this Court would urge one or more of the parties, the plaintiff
involved in this case, perhaps, or some other plaintiff, to seek an early appeal of
this decision. In my opinion, as a matter of law what I have done is right. As
a matter of justice, what I am doing is wrong.
Brief for Appellant at 9, Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 III. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1st
Dist. 1982), appeal granted, 91 111. 2d 569 (1982).
8. 107 111. App. 3d at 657, 437 N.E.2d at 912; see National Bank of Bloomington v. Nor-
folk & W. Ry., 73 I11. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978) (punitive damages claim allowed in
statutory personal injury action); Howe v. Clark Equip. Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 45, 432 N.E.2d
621 (4th Dist. 1982) (punitive damages claim allowed in common law personal injury action).
9. 107 I11. App. 3d at 658, 437 N.E.2d at 913 (citing National Bank of Bloomington v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 160, 174, 383 N.E.2d 919, 924 (1978)).
10. See National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 I11. 2d 160, 179, 383
N.E.2d 919, 927 (1978) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (for over 100 years, recovery under the Survival
Act has been limited to compensatory damages); Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61
Ill. 2d 31, 33, 330 N.E.2d 509, 510 (1975) (the Survival Act "has never been thought to authorize
the award of punitive damages"); see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, I11. on May
25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981) (based on the Mattyasovszky and National Bank deci-
sions, Illinois does not allow punitive damages in wrongful death or survival actions); Hamrick
v. Lewis, 515 F. Supp. 983, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("Illinois law is clear that punitive damages
may not be recovered under either the Survival Act [citations omitted] or the Wrongful Death
Act."); In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("Il-
linois law does not permit the recovery of punitive damages ... either under the Wrongful
Death Act or the Survival Act.").
11. For a discussion and analysis of the problems with punitive damage awards in products
liability actions, see infra notes 43-86 and accompanying text.
12. The phrase "mass tort situation" will be used to describe those products liability cases
in which a single product has caused injuries to many plaintiffs in different locales over an
extended period of time. Examples of mass tort situations include the asbestos, Dalkon Shield
IUD, DES, and Agent Orange cases. The mass tort situation is distinguishable from the mass
disaster, which occurs in a single locale at a single time. Examples of mass disaster situations
include airline crashes and the Kansas City Hyatt skywalk collapse.
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HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS SURVIVAL ACT
The Survival Act has a history of rather confused interpretations, begin-
ning with its relation to the Wrongful Death Act. 3 The Illinois Supreme
Court first distinguished the Survival Act from the Wrongful Death Act in
Holton v. Daly.' The Holton court held that the Wrongful Death Act was
the exclusive remedy for damages resulting from personal injuries which
caused the decedent's death, and that recovery for such injuries was limited
to pecuniary damages.' Consequently, recovery under the Survival Act was
limited to damages for injuries sustained by the decedent which did not
directly cause his or her death.' 6 Thus, personal injury damages for medical
bills, pain and suffering, and lost wages were not recoverable if the dece-
dent's death was caused by those injuries because the Wrongful Death Act
limited recovery to pecuniary damages. Conversely, those same damages were
recoverable under the Survival Act, but only if the decedent's death resulted
from a cause other than the personal injuries on which the suit was based.' 7
This distinction was expressly overruled ninety-two years later in Murphy
v. Martin Oil Co." The Murphy court declared that to allow recovery only
for a decedent's death, and not for the personal injuries which caused the
death, provided inadequate justice.'" To remedy this injustice, the court held
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1981). The Illinois Wrongful Death Act provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default,
and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corporation
which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
Id.
14. 106 Ill. 131 (1882). In Holton, the plaintiff had been injured while employed by the
defendant. During the course of his suit for damages, the plaintiff died from his injuries. His
wife was substituted as plaintiff under the Survival Act. The defendant appealed the judgment
in favor of the plaintiff's wife, alleging that because the plaintiff died from his injuries, his
wife could recover only under the Wrongful Death Act, since the Survival Act was limited
to actions where the decedent had died from a cause other than the injuries on which the
suit was based. Id. at 132-34.
15. Id. at 137-38.
16. Id.; see also Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 376 Ill. 138, 33 N.E.2d 211 (1941)
(any deviation from the Holton doctrine must originate from the legislature); Wilcox v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 278 11. 465, 116 N.E. 151 (1917) (following the Holton rule).
17. Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 11. 2d 423, 426-27, 308 N.E.2d 583, 584-85 (1974).
18. Id. at 430-31, 308 N.E.2d at 586. In Murphy, the plaintiff's decedent was injured in
a fire on the defendant's premises and died of those injuries nine days later. The plaintiff brought
an action for pecuniary damages under the Wrongful Death Act, and for damages for the dece-
dent's conscious pain and suffering, loss of wages, and property damage during the nine day
interval between the injury and death. Id. at 425, 308 N.E.2d at 583-84.
19. Id. at 431, 308 N.E.2d at 587. The Murphy court believed that the Holton rule pro-
vided inadequate justice because it denied recovery for expenses incurred while the decedent
was still alive, and denied recovery of lost earnings during any period between the injury and
the death. Id.
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that an action for personal injuries, even injuries directly resulting in the
decedent's death, should not abate.20 Consequently, such an action could
be brought by the decedent's estate under the Survival Act. Moreover, the
Murphy court held that an action for personal injuries may be maintained
under the Survival Act concurrently with an action for pecuniary loss under
the Wrongful Death Act.'
The question left unanswered by the Murphy decision, however, was exactly
what types of damages are recoverable under the Survival Act. The Wrongful
Death Act limits recovery to pecuniary loss.2" A common law action for
personal injuries, on the other hand, allows recovery of pecuniary loss as
well as damages such as medical bills, lost wages, and general damages for
pain and suffering. 3 In certain circumstances, punitive damages are also
recoverable in a common law personal injury action."4 Although the Mur-
phy court determined that damages for personal injuries were recoverable
after the injured person's death, the court left unresolved whether all damages
recoverable in a common law action-including punitive damages-also would
be recoverable in a Survival Act action.
This question was answered in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co.,
in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that punitive damages were
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 889, 388 N.E.2d 906 (5th Dist. 1979) (damages
are limited to pecuniary loss of decedent's spouse and next of kin); Baird v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 11 IU. App. 3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365 (4th Dist. 1973), aff'd, 63 111. 2d 463, 349
N.E.2d 413 (1976) (recovery under the Wrongful Death Act is strictly limited to pecuniary
injuries resulting from the death); Illinois Cen. R.R. Co. v. Ashline, 56 Ill. App. 475 (2d Dist.
1894) (damages can only be measured on the basis of pecuniary loss sustained). Punitive damages
are not recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act. Conant v. Griffin, 48 111. 410, 412-13 (1868);
see also infra note 43.
23. See, e.g., Central Ry. Co. v. Serfass, 153 111. 379, 39 N.E. 119 (1894) (loss of earnings,
medical expenses, pain and suffering); Lawson v. Belt Ry. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 7, 339 N.E.2d
381 (1st Dist. 1975) (logs of earnings, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other depriva-
tions caused by the injury); see also Kiely, Damages, Equity, and Restitution-Illinois Remedial
Options, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 274, 279 (1975) (traditional common law action for personal
injuries includes recovery for pain and suffering plus special damages, including medical ex-
penses and lost wages) [hereinafter cited as Kiely].
24. See, e.g., Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974) (punitive damages recoverable
under "certain aggravating circumstances"); Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Lauth, 216 111.
176, 74 N.E. 738 (1905) (punitive damages recoverable when wilful, malicious or wanton con-
duct is shown); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 111. App. 3d 1102, 427 N.E.2d 608 (4th
Dist. 1981) (punitive damages are awarded if the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects
a "flagrant indifference to the public safety"); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d
109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1st Dist. 1969), aff'd, 46 111. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) (circumstances
under which punitive damages are recoverable in products cases include: when the corporation
had knowledge of danger inherent in the product, when the corporation failed to warn the
public of the danger, and when the corporation had notice of prior claims of accidents iden-
tical to the plaintiff's); Madison v. Wigal, 18 111. App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (2d Dist. 1958)
(aggravating circumstances under which punitive damages will be awarded include wantonness
and wilfulness, malice, fraud, oppression, violence, and recklessness).
25. 61 111. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
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unavailable under the Survival Act. In affirming the trial court's vacation
of punitive damages awarded by the jury, the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that the Survival Act "has never been thought to authorize the award of
punitive damages."2 6 The Mattyasovszky court interpreted the Murphy deci-
sion as "intrinsically. . . emphasiz[ing] the compensatory nature of damages
authorized under the Survival Act." 27 Thus, the court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that the Murphy decision authorized the recovery of punitive
damages."
The Mattyasovszky decision has been criticized for misinterpreting the Sur-
vival Act as creating a new cause of action in itself. Rather, the better inter-
pretation is that the Survival Act merely permits the decedent's personal
representative to maintain the statutory and common law actions which the
decedent possessed at the time of his death-actions which otherwise would
have abated at common law.2" This latter interpretation of the Survival Act
was enunciated in National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & Western
Railway Co.3" In that case the Illinois Supreme Court permitted punitive
damages, which were available to the decedent under the Public Utilities
Act,3 ' to be recovered in an action brought by the decedent's representative
under the Survival Act. The National Bank court recognized that the Sur-
vival Act does not create a new cause of action; rather, it is merely the
vehicle by which those statutory or common law actions, already accrued
26. Id. at 33, 330 N.E.2d at 510. The Mattyasovszky court cited no authority for this
proposition.
27. Id. The court did not give a basis for its interpretation.
28. Id.
29. Kiely, supra note 22, at 281. Two cases have adopted this interpretation of the Survival
Act. National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 IlI. 2d 160, 172, 383 N.E.2d
919, 923 (1978); Howe v. Clark Equip. Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 45, 50, 432 N.E.2d 621, 624-25
(4th Dist. 1982). The defendants in Froud argued in their brief to the Illinois Supreme Court
that the Mattyasovszky court's interpretation of the Survival Act is correct. In support of this
argument, they noted that the Survival Act has been reenacted several times without change.
They additionally noted that less than one year after the Mattyasovszky decision, a bill in-
troduced in the Illinois House, which would have specifically added punitive damages to those
claims listed in the Survival Act, died in committee. The defendants interpreted this legislative
history as indicating that recovery under the Survival Act is limited to those types of claims
expressly listed in the text of the act, effectively creating a new cause of action rather than
simply maintaining any claims existing before death. Brief for Appellant at 18, Froud v. Celotex
Corp., 107 Il. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1st Dist. 1982), appeal granted, 91 Ill. 2d 19 (1982).
30. 73 II. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978).
31. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I11 2, § 77 (1981). The Public Utility Act provides in pertinent part:
In case any public utility shall do, cause to be done or permit to be done any
act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit
to do any act, matter or thing required to be done either by any provisions of
this Act or any rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission, issued under
authority of this Act, the public utility shall be liable to the persons or corpora-
tions affected thereby for all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or resulting
therefrom, and if the court shall find that the act or omission was wilful, the court
may in addition to the actual damages, award damages for the sake of example
and by the way of punishment. ...
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to the plaintiff before he dies, survive his death.3" The court expressly stated
that the "Survival Act itself neither authorizes nor prohibits punitive
damages." 33 In making this statement, the National Bank court could be
interpreted as designating the Survival Act a vehicle for all personal injury
causes of action which survive the death of the injured party-including a
cause of action for punitive damages in situations where the injured party
would have been entitled to punitive damages had he lived.
The National Bank court determined that the Mattyasovszky decision did
not stand for the broad proposition that punitive damages are unavailable
when the injury results in death.34 Rather, the court interpreted the Mat-
tyasovszky decision as holding only that punitive damages were improper
when the party whose conduct primarily was responsible for the injury has
been dismissed from the action.3" In the National Bank case, however, the
responsible parties had not been dismissed from the action. The National
Bank court further distinguished Mattyasovszky as a case involving a com-
mon law action for punitive damages, 3 6 whereas National Bank involved a
statute which expressly authorized punitive damage awards.3 7 This distinc-
tion between common law and statutory law left unclear whether the court
was limiting its holding to statutory causes of action for punitive damages
brought by representatives of the decedent under the Survival Act. Moreover,
this distinction contradicts the broad statement made by the court that the
Survival Act neither authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages. These
ambiguities were resolved in Froud v. Celotex Corp.38
32. 73 Ill. 2d at 172, 383 N.E.2d at 923. In National Bank, the decedent was injured when
the defendant's train hit the decedent's car as it crossed the railroad tracks. The decedent died
seven days later. The plaintiff, as administrator of the decedent's estate, charged the defendant
with failure to keep its right-of-way clear of obstructions, and sought punitive damages under
the Public Utilities Act. Id. at 165-66, 383 N.E.2d at 920-21.
33. Id. at 174, 383 N.E.2d at 924.
34. Id.
35. Id. Mattyasovszky involved a boy who was run over and killed by a bus. The claim
against the bus driver was dismissed by the plaintiff prior to the case going to jury. Thus,
the only defendant was the bus company, based on vicarious liability. 61 111. 2d at 32, 37,
330 N.E.2d at 510, 512.
36. 73 111. 2d at 173-74, 383 N.E.2d at 924. The Mattyasovszky court did not state why
punitive damages in a common law action are not recoverable under the Survival Act, other
than by explaining that the Act "has never been thought to authorize the award of punitive
damages." 61 I11. 2d at 33, 330 N.E.2d at 510. That case did not address the question of
whether the Survival Act would permit recovery where a statute specifically authorized punitive
damage awards.
37. 73 I11. 2d at 173-74, 383 N.E.2d at 924. The National Bank court stated that to deny
punitive damages when the statute expressly authorized their recovery would pervert the statute's
intention. Id. at 174, 383 N.E.2d at 924. The court, however, did not state why a case involv-
ing statutory authorization of punitive damages should be distinguished from a case where
the defendant's conduct could justify punitive damages under the common law. Justice Ryan,
dissenting in National Bank, noted that nothing in the Survival Act allowed punitive damages
recovery in a statutory action but not in a common law action. Id. at 178, 383 N.E.2d at
926 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
38. 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1st Dist. 1982), appeal granted, 91 111. 2d 569
(1982).
FROUD v. CELOTEX CORP.
THE FROUD DECISION
The Froud case involved common law actions for personal injuries and
punitive damages brought pursuant to the Survival Act. Because the actions
were based on the common law rather than on a statute, the Froud court
might have been expected to follow the Mattyasovszky decision and hold
that punitive damages were not recoverable. Instead, the appellate court in
Froud considered the National Bank decision to be "binding precedent" for
the proposition that both common law and statutory actions for punitive
damages survive the death of injured persons.39 The Froud court noted that
there was no logical basis for distinguishing between statutory and common
law actions for punitive damages; the goal of punitive damages is identical
in both instances."' The Froud court was persuaded that the National Bank
holding was based on an interpretation of the Survival Act as a neutral vehicle
which neither authorized nor prohibited punitive damages." Thus, the court
concluded that although National Bank had distinguished statutory from com-
mon law, its holding was not limited to statutory actions for punitive
damages. 2 As a result, if the decedent could have recovered punitive damages,
either by common law principles or by statute, the Froud decision permits
the decedent's survivor to recover those same punitive damages."3
The significance of the Froud decision is magnified because Froud involved
a mass tort situation. The defendant asbestos manufacturers and sellers, in
their consolidated brief to the appellate court, maintained that punitive
damages in mass tort situations would violate public policy because of the
possibility that several plaintiffs recovering substantial punitive damage awards
could bankrupt even the wealthiest company." The Froud court rejected this
argument, stating that relieving companies of their liability for punitive
damages because they injured a large number of people would encourage
wrongdoers to continue their misconduct until it reached mass tort
proportions." The court, however, did recognize that some judicial protec-
tion might be necessary to prevent the "execution" of defendants in mass
39. Id. at 658, 437 N.E.2d at 913.
40. Id. The goal of punitive damages was stated to be "to promote public safety by punishing
outrageous misconduct." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Froud court rejected the common law/statutory distinction used by the National
Bank court to distinguish Mattyasovszky. Id. For a discussion of this distinction, see supra
note 36. If the Froud interpretation is adopted, Mattyasovszky would either be overruled or
limited to cases where the person responsible for the injury is not a party to the suit.
43. This interpretation of the National Bank decision was adopted in another recent Illinois
appellate court decision, Howe v. Clark Equip. Co., 104 Il1. App. 3d 45, 432 N.E.2d 621
(4th Dist. 1982). The Howe decision also maintains the dichotomy between the Survival Act
and the Wrongful Death Act as to punitive damages recovery. Thus, Illinois still does not
allow recovery of punitive damages in an action brought under the Wrongful Death Act.
44. 107 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 437 N.E.2d at 913. The court noted the Dalkon Shield IUD
litigation as an example of the possibility of bankrupting the defendant ($2.3 billion worth
of punitive damage claims, but net worth of only $280,394,000). Id. at 659, 437 N.E.2d at 913.
45. Id. at 658, 437 N.E.2d at 913.
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tort cases caused by excessive punitive damage awards." The court noted
the recent Dalkon Shield IUD litigation in California, 7 and its approach
of creating a class action for the question of punitive damages only, but
would not express an opinion on the merits of this approach.48
The Froud court's decision to permit survival of punitive damage claims
is a reform long overdue in Illinois civil litigation. Previously, when punitive
damage claims were not held to survive the death of the injured party, the
old adage that it is cheaper to kill than to injure applied in Illinois."9
Moreover, there has never been any basis given for the argument that the
Survival Act prohibits punitive damages, other than the fact that courts
theretofore had not awarded punitive damages in survival actions. Accord-
ingly, the Froud decision should be upheld. In so doing, however, it will
be necessary for the Illinois Supreme Court to consider means to control
punitive damage awards in mass tort cases, so that defendants will not be
"executed" by excessive damages awards. A review of the concept of punitive
damages is necessary before considering means for their control.
Ti CONCEPT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages serve several functions in products liability law. The
primary functions are to punish the defendant manufacturer for marketing
a highly unsafe product and to deter the manufacturer from engaging in
similar conduct in the future."0 Punitive damages are believed to be the best
means of achieving the goals of punishment and deterrence because they
46. Id. at 659, 437 N.E.2d at 914. For a discussion of possible solutions to this problem,
see infra notes 88-127 and accompanying text.
47. See In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
48. 107 Il1. App. 3d at 659, 437 N.E.2d at 914. For a discussion of the Dalkon Shield
litigation, and of class actions in general, see infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
49. 107 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 437 N.E.2d at 912.
50. In Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Il1. App. 3d 1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (5th Dist.
1981), the court stated that punishment and deterrence are the only recognized purposes of
punitive damages in Illinois, as well as in most jurisdictions. Id. at 1123, 420 N.E.2d at 1059
(citing ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, No. 35.01 (2d ed. 1971) and Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 187-88, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978)). The Beaver court rejected
the theory that punitive damages function as additional compensation to plaintiffs. Id.; see
infra note 54 and accompanying text. In Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d
1102, 427 N.E.2d 608 (4th Dist. 1981), the court held that the goals of punitive damages in
products liability cases are the same, punishment and deterrence, but the focus is on deterring
manufacturer misconduct by making the conduct unprofitable to an unpredictable degree. Id.
at 1113, 427 N.E.2d at 616. For a general discussion of the functions of punitive damages,
see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHNER, PuNTrrIVE DAMAGES, Table 4.1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as GHIARDI
& KncmNER]; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HAsTNos
L.J. 639, 647-50 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mallor & Roberts]; Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 1257, 1277-99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen];
Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 139,
142-43 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Robinson & Kane]; Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages
Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 passim (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Mass Liability].
19831 FROUD v. CELOTEX CORP.
remove the incentive which caused the manufacturer to engage in the miscon-
duct: additional profits to be made by marketing the product in its unsafe
condition." Another function attributed to punitive damages is that the
availability of such damages will induce plaintiffs to bring suits, and thereby,
aid in the enforcement of the law. 2 The premise of this argument is that
without the availability of punitive damages, the costs of litigation will deter
legitimate plaintiffs from bringing suit against a large corporate entity."
Punitive damages, however, would further compensate plaintiffs whose actual
damages exceed those recoverable by law or whose compensatory recovery
is substantially reduced by attorney fees." Thus, if the potential plaintiff
knows that he has a good chance of recovering punitive damages, he may
be more willing to file an action.
To justify an award of punitive damages, the defendant manufacturer must
be shown to have engaged in some sort of "reckless disregard" for the
public's safety or "flagrant misconduct."" Examples of such misconduct
include: falsifying test data," advertising misrepresentations as to the pro-
duct's safety,57 violating compulsory safety standards,5 8 demonstrating a
51. See Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 140. Other authors, while not recognizing
punitive damages as the best means, have found them to be an important means of achieving
deterrence because they attack the profit incentive. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at
649; Owen, supra note 50, at 1285-86; Note, Mass Liability, supra note 50, at 1802.
52. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 649-50; Owen, supra note 50, at 1278; Robinson
& Kane, supra note 50, at 142.
53. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 649-50; Owen, supra note 50, at 1287-88;
Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 142-43.
54. See, e.g., Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 643 (recognizing a compensatory func-
tion of punitive damages). Four states, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan and New Hampshire,
have explicitly treated punitive damages as additional compensation that a plaintiff may recover.
See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); Westview Cemetery,
Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975); Johnson v. Morris, 158 Ga. 403, 123
S.E. 707 (1924); McFadden v. Tate, 350 Mich. 84, 85 N.W.2d 181 (1957); Wise v. Daniel,
221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 289 A.2d
666 (1972); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872); see also GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note
50, at §§ 4.02-4.06.
55. The phrase "flagrant misconduct" has been adopted by the Fourth District of the Illinois
Appellate Court as the standard for recovery of punitive damages in products liability suits.
Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 111. App. 3d 1102, 1115, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (4th Dist.
1981). For a discussion of the "flagrant misconduct" standard, see infra notes 90-102 and
accompanying text. The "reckless disregard" standard has been adopted by the Products Liability
Act which is pending before the United States Senate. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
For a jurisdictional summary of the various types of conduct justifying punitive damages, see
L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 3 PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 36A (1982); GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra
note 50, at § 5.01.
56. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967) (test data submitted to FDA falsified).
57. See, e.g., d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977) (carpet
manufacturer misrepresented fiber as nonflammable).
58. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967) (violation of FDA requirements).
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callous attitude toward the potential harm,59 and utilizing inadequate testing
or manufacturing procedures. 6  Additionally, to prove the required
"flagrancy," it must be shown that the manufacturer was aware of, or in-
different to, an unnecessary risk of injury and refused to reduce the danger
to an acceptable level." Juries can award punitive damages as a means of
communicating their unwillingness to allow companies to continue extra-
ordinarily wrongful business practices. Under these circumstances, punitive
damages have been deemed desirable to exemplify the social outrage aimed
at the manufacturers. Consequently, the concept of punitive damages can
serve a valuable function in products liability/mass tort situations.
Opponents of punitive damages, however, direct their arguments not to
the function of punitive damages, but to the lack of controls over awards.
The most oft-cited attack on punitive damages in products liability cases
is found in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 2 Judge Friendly, writing
for the majority, listed three factors which preclude achievement of the
objectives of punitive damages in products cases: (1) the questionable fairness
of punishing innocent shareholders for conduct in which they took no part;
(2) the probability that the manufacturers have insured themselves against
punitive damages; and (3) the difficulties in measuring and controlling the
amount of the punitive damage awards.63
In the years following the Roginsky decision, these factors have been
criticized as either irrelevant or non-prohibitive.6" First, it has been argued
that the profits resulting from the sale of excessively dangerous products
are "excessive profits. ' 65 Under this analysis, punitive damages amount to
only a recoupment of an unjust enrichment of the manufacturer corpora-
tion and its shareholders. Therefore, there is no justification for viewing
shareholders as innocent victims of unscrupulous corporate management.
6 6
59. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-77-61, slip op. (Super. Ct., Orange
County, Cal., Feb. 7, 1978), aff'd as amended, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981) (callous attitude toward potential danger as represented in a cost-benefit analysis
memorandum).
60. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 III. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1st Dist.
1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) (failure to test can cap and seams for
ability to withstand internal chemical pressure).
61. See Owen, supra note 50, at 1362.
62. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
63. Id. at 838-50.
64. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 289-98, 294 N.W.2d 437, 453-57;
see also Owen, supra note 50, at 1299-1325 (detailed critique of Roginsky, concluding that
the benefits resulting from punitive damage awards greatly outweigh such "occasional harms");
Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 141-44 (concerns expressed in Roginsky are outweighed
by the benefits of imposing punitive damages in products liability cases).
65. Owen, supra note 50, at 1304. Such profits are excessive because they represent money
which should have been put into the manufacture or marketing of the products in order to
make them more safe.
66. See Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416,
427 (1974) ("No sufficient reason appears why shareholders should be seen as captive innocent
hostages to the inhuman management of a corporate juggernaut"); Owen, supra note 50, at
466 [Vol. 32:457
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Second, unlike many states, Illinois does not allow insurance coverage for
punitive damages.67 In Beaver v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,68 it was
held that public policy prohibits insurance against liability for punitive
damages arising out of one's misconduct. 69 Thus, Judge Friendly's argument
that insurance coverage would preclude the achievement of the goals of
punitive damages is inapplicable in Illinois.
Finally, several approaches for measuring punitive damage awards have
been suggested,70 with some elements common to all. Those jurisdictions
which recognize an inherently compensatory nature to punitive damages may
1304 (shareholders should not be viewed as innocent insofar as punitive damages are concerned
because punitive damages do not assign blame to shareholders personally, but rather only "deplete
the corporate treasury," and also because it is shareholders who reap the profits of marketing
excessively dangerous products); Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 143 ("Shareholders of
errant corporations are thus hardly more 'innocent' than the absentee slaveholder who hires
an overseer to drive his slaves and to forward resulting profits, but who claims 'innocence'
because he has not himself wielded the whip.").
67. Nineteen states allow insurance coverage against punitive damage judgments: Arkansas,
Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Nine states prohibit such coverage as being against public policy: California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Florida and
Missouri have case law both allowing and prohibiting insurance coverage against punitive damages.
GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 50, at §§ 7.29-7.30; see also Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency
in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 71 (1982) (the majority of states
allow insurance coverage of punitive damages).
68. 95 111. App. 3d 1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (5th Dist. 1981). Beaver involved a garnishment
action by the plaintiff against his insurer to recover the amount of a punitive damages verdict
levied against him. The court held that punitive damages may not be insured in Illinois because
the function and nature of punitive damages prohibits insurance against them. Id. at 1124,
420 N.E.2d at 1060. The Beaver court stated that its holding did not affect the rule established
by Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 I11. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (Ist Dist. 1969), that
an employer may insure himself against vicarious liability for punitive damages assessed against
him by virtue of an employee's misconduct. Beaver, 95 111. App. 3d at 1125, 420 N.E.2d at
1061. The court reasoned that this type of insurance did not violate public policy because the
employer is not the one who committed the wrongful act, and thus, is not the one against
whom punishment should be levied. Id.
69. Id. at 1125, 420 N.E.2d at 1060. The Beaver court found this decision to be consistent
with the goals of punitive damages in Illinois: punishment and deterrence. Id.; see infra notes
49 & 67.
70. See Owen, supra note 50, at 1315-18 (factors to be considered in measuring punitive
damages include: costs of litigation to plaintiff, effects of particular award amounts on the
related goals of deterrence and law enforcement, specific evidence that the defendant manufac-
turer might repeat the misconduct, and the punishment function as determined by the wealth
of the particular defendant); Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 666-69 (suggested guidelines
include the severity of harm which has either actually occurred or is likely to occur, degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, profitability of the conduct, financial position
of the defendant, amount of compensatory damages assessed, costs of litigation, potential criminal
sanctions and other civil actions pending against the defendant based on the same conduct);
Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 145-46 (considerations in measuring punitive damages
include wealth of the defendant, ease with which the defendant may pass the cost along to
others, extent to which the conduct in question had a business motive, degree of outrageousness
of the defendant's conduct, and the defendant's amenability to reformation).
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prefer a method which designates reimbursement of the plaintiff's litigation
costs as the minimum amount recoverable.7 The "reasonable relationship"
test also may be utilized. This test holds that punitive damages must bear
a reasonable relation to the plaintiff's actual damages." The "reasonable
relationship" test, however, has been severely criticized as being artificial
and meaningless, and as possibly undercutting the deterrent effect of punitive
damages. 3 Although the measurement of punitive damages poses the greatest
problem to their assessment, several commentators feel that it is not
insurmountable.
Another criticism of punitive damages is that although they are a part
of the civil system, they are penal in nature. Opponents of punitive damages
argue that the judge in a civil trial does not have the safeguards and stand-
ards followed by the sentencing judge in criminal actions, such as legislatively
determined minimum and maximum penalties and sentencing hearings in
which evidence excluded from the trial is available to the judge." Further-
more, several safeguards available to the criminal defendant are not available
to the civil defendant in a products liability case, including the protection
against double jeopardy, the higher standard of proof, and the requirement
of a unanimous verdict.7 6 Nevertheless, there are certain criminal safeguards
which are available to the punitive damages defendant, either by law or by
practice. Criminal safeguards generally available to defendants in punitive
damages cases include de facto confrontation of adverse witnesses and the
right to trial by jury. 7 In any event, it is questionable whether criminal
71. See Owen, supra note 50, at 1315-16.
72. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 666-67; see, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,
594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (punitive damages should be reasonably related to the plaintiff's
actual damages so the defendant is not punished for all wrongs committed against all pur-
chasers and users of its product), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980); Liodes v. Sahadi,
19 Cal. 2d 278, 562 P.2d 316, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977) (a punitive damage award should
have some reasonable relation to actual damages).
73. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 666-67. For a summary of how various jurisdic-
tions view the reasonable relationship test, see GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 50, at § 5.39.
Other approaches to measuring punitive damages include the following concepts: the award
should be of a sufficient sum to encourage plaintiffs to sue; the award should be in relation
to the magnitude of risk to which the general public was exposed by the defendant's miscon-
duct, rather than to the extent of harm suffered by the particular plaintiff, in order to attack
the profit incentive that led to the manufacturer's misconduct; the award should correspond
to the manufacturer's degree of awareness of the seriousness of the risk of injury from the
product; and the award should be tailored to the wealth of the defendant to optimize the goals
of punishment and deterrence. See Owen, supra note 50, at 1316-18, 1316 n.286.
74. For a detailed discussion of approaches to measurement and control of punitive damages,
see infra notes 101-28 and accompanying text.
75. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 663.
76. See Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 408, 413-18, 424-26 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Criminal Safeguards].
77. Id. at 412, 418-24. The de facto confrontation of adverse witnesses arises because plain-
tiffs will usually testify, giving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine at trial and
take depositions during discovery. Id.
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safeguards are necessary in products cases, since no loss of liberty is in-
volved, or even desirable in light of the inherent flexibility of tort law.
The primary criticism of punitive damages in products liability/mass tort
situations is the fear of punitive damages "overkill" against the
manufacturer.78 Overkill reflects the fear that a manufacturer involved in
a mass tort situation may have so many punitive damage judgments entered
against it that the company will be forced into bankruptcy." A review of
the litigation surrounding the drug MER/29,8 ° the only products liability/mass
tort situation to have been fully litigated, suggests that this fear of overkill
may be unfounded. Only eleven of approximately one thousand MER/29
cases went to a jury; of these, four verdicts were for the defendant and
seven for the plaintiff.8 Only three juries awarded punitive damages; one
of the awards was reversed on appeal, and the other two were upheld as
reduced on remittitur by the trial judge.8" Thus, the total amount of punitive
damages levied against Richardson-Merrell, the manufacturer of MER/29,
was one million dollars. This figure was hardly large enough to bankrupt
Richardson-Merrell, which was forced to pay out only seven million dollars
of its own reserve of forty-two million dollars from surplus earnings for
settlements and judgments.3
Although the MER/29 experience may not be indicative of current mass
78. The following have all noted the overkill argument: Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982); Note, Mass Liability, supra note 50, at 1799. Professor Owen also discussed
the overkill argument in his recent article, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Unsafe Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Owen
1982]. This article is a follow-up to his seminal work on punitive damages in products liability
cases. See Owen, supra note 50. Both articles are very comprehensive and are recommended
reading on the issue of punitive damages.
79. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 663; Owen,-supra note 50, at 1325; Owen 1982,
supra note 78, at 6; Note, Mass Liability, supra note 50, at 1799.
80. For a comprehensive review of the MER/29 litigation, see Rheingold, The MER/29
Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 116 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Rheingold]. MER/29 was a prescription drug intended to reduce cholesterol
levels which was marketed by Richardson-Merrell, Inc., and which caused cataracts. Richardson-
Merrell apparently knew of this side effect but did not warn physicians or consumers, and
withheld this knowledge from the Food and Drug Administration.
81. Id. at 132-33.
82. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (jury punitive
award of $100,000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (compensatory
award affirmed, punitive award reversed); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App.
2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (remittitur of $500,000 jury punitive award to $250,000 affirmed);
Ostopowitz v. Win. S. Merrell Co., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Westchester
County, N.Y. 1967) (remittitur of $850,000 jury punitive award to $100,000).
83. The seven million dollars was the amount which Richardson-Merrell paid out after the
depletion of its fifteen million dollars in liability insurance. Thus, although Richardson-Merrell
had to pay only seven million dollars out of its own assets, the total amount of settlements
and judgments against the corporation was twenty-two million dollars. Rheingold, supra note
80, at 137-41.
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tort cases, especially since juries are awarding ever increasing amounts for
punitive damages, 8' it seems to demonstrate that the possible bankruptcy
of the defendant manufacturers is far from certain. Additionally, in many
mass tort situations there are several defendants. Consequently, where
apportionment among joint tortfeasors is permitted,8 5 it is likely that each
defendant will be liable for only a percentage of the amount awarded. No
single company would take the full brunt of the punitive damages claims.
Coupled with the fact that payment of a punitive damages judgment is or-
dinarily tax deductible to the defendant corporation,8" the effect of such
awards on the financial integrity of the manufacturer may not be as
devastating as manufacturers suggest. 7
The above arguments illustrate that the difficulties with punitive damages
in products liability/mass tort situations do not lie in their existence, but
rather in their control. If controlled to prevent punitive damages overkill,
such awards will be justified by their effectiveness in promoting product
84. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981) (jury punitive award of $127,000,000 remitted to $3,500,000); Palmer v. A.H. Robins
Co., No. C60442 (Dist. Ct. Denver County, Colo., filed July 30, 1979) (jury punitive award
of $6,200,000); Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 106 111. App. 3d 1, 435 N.E.2d 729 (5th
Dist. 1982) (jury punitive award of $15,000,000 remitted to $7,500,000; further remitted to
$650,000 by appellate court, an amount equal to the compensatory damages award), appeal
granted, 91 111. 2d 581 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, No. 23,608, slip op. (Dist. Ct.
Matagorda County, Tex., May 29, 1980) (jury punitive award of $4,000,000). For a discussion
of the recent large punitive damage awards in products liability cases, see Owen 1982, supra
note 78, at 2-6. One recent study has found that "[tihere were more punitive damage awards
in 1980 and 1981 than in the entire history of the United States." Wheeler, Symposium Discus-
sion, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 155, 160 (1982) (data based on a Lexis search of punitive awards
in products liability cases).
85. Courts are widely divided as to whether, in an action against joint tortfeasors, punitive
damages may be apportioned among the defendants. California, Kentucky, Maryland, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and the federal courts allow apportionment of punitive
damages based on the differing degrees of culpability. Georgia, Illinois, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont do not allow apportionment of punitive damages. See generally
Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 666 (1968). Under the Illinois rule, if the evidence justifies damages against
only some defendants, the plaintiff is not allowed to recover punitive damages from any of
the defendants unless those liable are sued separately. Pardridge v. Brady, 7 I11. App. 639
(1st Dist. 1881). This rule would help prevent overkill because it forces the plaintiff to bring
separate actions to prove punitive damages against each defendant, something plaintiffs may
not want to do if they have already recovered compensatory damages. The rule does not, however,
preclude overkill if the evidence justifies punitive damages against each defendant.
86. See Owen 1982, supra note 78, at 20 n.92; Phillips, The Tax Consequences of a Punitive
Damages Award, 31 HASTnNGS L.J. 909 (1980). Phillips suggests that there may be a growing
trend toward denying deductions of punitive damage awards based on the premise that such
deductions violate public policy. Id. at 911.
87. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (detailed
evaluation of the bankruptcy argument). The Wangen court reviewed various studies on the
effect of punitive damages in products liability cases on the financial integrity of defendant
manufacturers, and found that "the data do not give credence to the manufacturer's dire predic-
tions." Id. at 294, 294 N.W.2d at 455.
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safety. Thus, while the Illinois Supreme Court should affirm the Froud deci-
sion, it also should address the question of how to control awards of punitive
damages in the products liability/mass tort situation.
SUGGESTED APPROACHES FOR THE HANDLING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY/MAss TORT SITUATIONS
L New Definition Approach
It has been suggested that punitive damages can be controlled best by utiliz-
ing a new, more specific definition of when they are appropriate in pro-
ducts cases." The definition suggested by Professor David (3. Owen is that
"punitive damages may be assessed against the manufacturer of a product
injuring the plaintiff if the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects the
manufacturer's flagrant indifference to the public safety." 89 Owen contends
that several characteristics of this definition differ from those of definitions
currently used by courts. First, this standard does not require that the pro-
duct be "defective." 9" The plaintiff seeking punitive damages must have been
injured by the product, and must show a casusal connection between the
alleged marketing misconduct and the injury.9' The plaintiff does not,
however, have to show that the product which caused the injury was defec-
tive in itself. According to Owen's definition, the "defect" is the manufac-
turer's misconduct in marketing the product, and thus, will be included in
proving the "flagrant indifference." 92 Second, Owen's use of the word reflects
entails an objective standard focusing on the manufacturer's apparent attitude
when the product was marketed, rather than the subjective standard of the
88. See Owen, supra note 50, at 1366. Owen argues that a new definitional standard to
determine when punitive damages are appropriate is needed because the current standards are
inadequate in the products liability context. He finds the "traditional punitive damages
phraseology" (e.g., "wilful and wanton," "malice, oppression, or gross negligence"), originally
designed for intentional tort cases, to be too limited and vague for products cases. Owen
also finds fault with recent attempts to define when punitive damages are appropriate in the
products liability area. He finds the phrase "conscious disregard of the public safety" too
restrictive and too difficult to prove. On the other hand, he finds the phrase "reckless disregard
of the public safety" too easily confused with "truly inadvertent conduct." He believes that
a more precise definition is necessary to fairly determine when punitive damages are appropriate
in products cases. Id. at 1364-66. In his 1982 article, Owen notes the rise of punitive damages
judgments in products cases. While continuing to support the "flagrant indifference to the
public safety" standard as being well suited to the "special circumstances of most products
cases," he now encourages the use of the higher "clear and convincing" standard of proof.
Owen 1982, supra note 78, at 21, 58-59. Owen concludes this article by stating that he "re-
main[s] convinced of the need to retain this tool of legal control [punitive damages] over cor-
porate abuses .. " Id. at 59.
89. Owen, supra note 50, 1367. Professor Owen's article provides a detailed comparison
between this definition and other definitions currently employed by courts. Id. at 1367-69.
90. Id. at 1367.
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manufacturer's actual "state of mind." '93 Furthermore, use of the word
flagrant does not require a conscious knowledge; awareness of the risks is
imputed to the manufacturer when its conduct is obviously and seriously
wrong, thereby adding to the objectivity of the definition.9 4 To date, two
courts have adopted the flagrant indifference definition."
Professor Owen contends that by utilizing this more specific definition,
the number of punitive damage awards will be limited in mass tort situa-
tions because a causal link must be proven and "flagrant" misconduct must
be shown.96 The drawback of this approach, however, is that it does nothing
to limit successive punitive damage awards in mass tort situations. Increas-
ingly, plaintiffs in these situations are forming groups to pool information
and evidence.9 Consequently, as more plaintiffs gain access to the evidence
necessary to meet this standard, the possibility increases that subsequent plain-
tiffs will not be able to recover punitive damages because of the depletion
of corporate funds. Some commentators argue that this possibility is justified
by the extra amount of time, work, and creativity the initial plaintiffs must
devote in order to recover their verdicts. 98 This view results in one or both
of two problems, depending on one's outlook. Subsequent plaintiffs who
have legitimate claims, but were unable to obtain judgments as quickly as
initial plaintiffs, may be deprived not only of punitive damages, but of com-
pensatory damages as well because of depletion of the defendant's funds.
On the other hand, inadequate punishment of defendants may result because
judges or juries in subsequent cases will decide that the defendant has been
punished enough and, therefore, will refuse to award punitive damages to
subsequent plaintiffs or will reduce such awards on remittitur. 99
II. Limiting the Amount Recoverable for Punitive Damages
A second approach to controlling punitive damage awards is to set a limit
on the amount that any single plaintiff may recover. A proposed House
Resolution' 9 adopts this approach by limiting an individual plaintiff's
recovery to the lesser of twice the plaintiff's compensatory damages, or one
93. Id. at 1368.
94. Id. at 1369. The use of flagrant, however, has been criticized as being equally as
broad a term as those currently employed. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 51 (1982).
95. Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Il. App. 3d 1102, 427 N.E.2d 608 (4th Dist. 1981);
Leichtamer v. A.M.C., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
96. See Owen, supra note 50, at 1368-69.
97. For example, there is a special litigation reporter for asbestos cases: AsBEsros LITIG.
REP. (Andrews Publication). The type of plaintiffs' group organized during the MER/29 litiga-
tion is discussed in Rheingold, supra note 80, at 120-21.
98. See Owen, supra note 50, at 1325; Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 144; Note,
Mass Liability, supra note 50, at 1811-12. Subsequent plaintiffs, on the other hand, have the
opportunity to gain information from earlier litigation.
99. See Note, Mass Liability, supra note 50, at 1801 & n.24.
100. H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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million dollars. A related approach establishes a ceiling on the total amount
of punitive damages recoverable against the manufacturer in actions arising
out of injuries from the same product. For example, the limit might be set
at the lesser of five million dollars or five percent of the defendant's net
worth; once the ceiling is reached, punitive dantages would be limited to
the plaintiff's attorney's fees and other costs of litigation, or would be totally
prohibited.' 0 '
The advantage of setting arbitrary limits on the amounts recoverable as
punitive damages is that presumably no defendant will go bankrupt as a
result of misconduct in marketing one product. The disadvantages of such
an approach, however, are manifold. First, in jurisdictions where apportion-
ment is not allowed, the setting of a single limit would be difficult in mass
tort situations in which there are many defendant manufacturers.0 2 Second,
the established limit might not be high enough for some manufacturers to
feel the impact of the damages; thus, the punishment goal might not be
achieved.° 3 Third, a set limit would defeat the deterrence goal as well because
companies would know just how much could be awarded against them and
could adjust their pricing schemes to reflect this knowledge. Finally, such
an approach would be very rigid; it would lack the flexibility necessary to
determine the appropriate punishment of exceedingly "flagrant" misconduct.
Iff. Procedural Approaches
Several approaches have been offered which are intended to modify the
procedure of awarding punitive damages. Perhaps the best known approach
is to create a class exclusively for assessing punitive damages. According
to the federal district court in California' 4 that adopted this approach,
plaintiffs would try their compensatory damages claims separately. Those
plaintiffs who successfully prove an injury caused by the manufacturer's
grievous misconduct would then be joined in a class action to determine
whether punitive damages are appropriate, and if so, in what amount. This
proposal appears to be logical, but, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit discovered, 0 5 in reality it is laden with problems. In products
101. See Owen 1982, supra note 78, at 49 n.227.
102. If the limit was set for the group of defendants as a whole, inadequate punishment
of the manufacturers might result. If, on the other hand, the limit was set for each individual
defendant, a method would be required for dividing the amount awarded and allocating a percen-
tage to each defendant.
103. See Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 145; Note, Mass Liability, supra note 50,
at 1804. Ideally, the computation of punitive damages should include a consideration of the
financial position of the defendant so that deterrence is achieved. Owen, supra note 50, at
1318-19; Robinson & Kane, supra note 50, at 145; Note, Mass Liability, supra note 50, at
1804. Single limits are not flexible enough to meet this goal.
104. See In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 526 F. Supp. 887, 897-98 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
105. See In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (class decertified because of problems with commonality
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liability/mass tort situtions, unique issues often outnumber common issues. For
example, often there is no one set of operative facts establishing liability
and no single proximate cause.' 6 In addition, issues such as adequacy of
warnings, or fraud and conspiracy, may be as different as "individual case
histories." 101
There is also a problem with plaintiffs who either opt out or are forced
out of the class for jurisdictional reasons: should these plaintiffs be allowed
to recover punitive damages on their own, and if so, does that defeat the
purpose of creating the class-to reduce the number of suits and awards?
A related problem involves the settlement process. When a class is certified
for the punitive damages issue, the settlement process slows ' because plain-
tiffs are unable to release their punitive damage claims, and defendants are
unwilling to pursue only compensatory damages settlements.' 9
Another problem involves the determination of when the class would close.
Many of the products in mass tort situations are on the market for several
years, and the injuries caused by these products may not become evident
until long after the product has been taken off the market." ' As the Ninth
Circuit concluded, there are too many difficulties with the class action to
adopt it as a means to control punitive damages."'
Some procedural proposals focus on the roles of the judge and jury. One
proposal would utilize a procedure similar to the criminal sentencing hear-
ing. The jury would decide whether punitive damages should be awarded;
then, the judge would hold a hearing to determine the amount to be
awarded." 2 To facilitate his assessment, the judge would consider evidence
outside the trial record such as whether previous punitive damage judgments
have been levied against the company, the financial situation of the com-
pany, and the profits made from marketing the product in question. The
and typicality); see also In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (Kansas
City Hyatt skywalk collapse); Ryan v. Eli Lily & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979) (DES
action); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. I11. 1978) (DES action); Snyder
v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1980) (Love Canal
toxic waste action); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1978)
(Dalkon Shield action). Conditional certification was granted in two cases: In re Agent Orange
Products Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3));
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (DES action under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3)).
106. See In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 693 F.2d at 853. This is due to the fact that products liability litigation involves many
individual products used by many persons in different manners.
107. Id. at 854.
108. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 n.12 (8th Cir. 1982).
109. Id.
110. A good example of such a product is asbestos. It is still unknown how many future
generations may be affected by exposure to asbestos products which have since been replaced
by the market.
111. In re Northern District of California, "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982).
112. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at 665.
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judge would issue written findings of fact supporting the amount awarded
and these findings would be subject to judicial review. ' 3
A similar proposal would leave both the determination of whether punitive
damages should be awarded and the amount of any award with the jury,
subject to the controls of the judge (e.g., remittitur)." 4 The jury in the first
trial against the manufacturer would award whatever amount it considered
proper."' In subsequent trials, the jury would engage in the same process,
but at this stage the judge would consider prior punitive damage awards
against the manufacturer to determine whether the prior awards, in toto,
are more or less than this particular jury would award." 6 If the prior awards,
in aggregate, are equal to, or greater than what this jury awarded, no
punitive damages would be awarded. If the prior awards, in aggregate, are
less, then the difference between them and the amount this jury awarded
would be granted." 7 Under this approach, the defendant's punitive damage
liability would never exceed the amount thought proper by the harshest jury,
nor would the defendant escape punishment. Both of the proposals dealing
with the roles of the judge and jury are appealing insofar as they would
minimize overkill, but neither completely eliminates the possibility that the
manufacturer could be bankrupted, or that it would be punished inadequately.
Furthermore, both proposals infringe on the functions and province of the
jury by severely limiting its ability to award punitive damages. As a result,
both proposals undermine one of the purposes of punitive damages: to show
society's outrage at the defendant's conduct." 8
IV. A Congressional Response
Senate bill 2631, which was recently introduced," 9 is yet another attempt
to develop a uniform product liability law.' 20 Section 13 of the bill provides
113. Id. at 665-66.
114. Note, Mass Liability, supra note 50, at 1800-01.
115. Id.
116. Id. For a review of this approach, see GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 50, at § 5.46.
117. For example, in the first case against the defendant product manufacturer, the jury
awards punitive damages of $1,000,000. This award would stand. In the second case against
the same defendant, the jury awards $1,500,000 in punitive damages. The judge would remit
the award to $500,000 because this is the amount greater than the award in the first case.
In the third case, the jury awards $750,000 in punitive damages. The judge here would vacate
the award because it is less than the amount awarded by the harshest jury and, thus, is deemed
to be included in the harshest jury's award.
118. It should be noted that some critics of punitive damages believe that it is important
to have the high level of control over the amount of punitive awards which is achieved by
transferring that decision from the jury to the judge. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 55 (1982).
119. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. 26311. This bill is spon-
sored by Sen. Robert Kasten, Jr. (R. Wis.) and co-sponsored by several senators, including
Sen. Charles Percy (R. Ill.).
120. This bill follows the Department of Commerce's Model Uniform Product Liability Act
(1979) and H.R. 7921, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (a Federal Uniform Product Liability Act).
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for the recovery and control of punitive damages.12 ' A higher standard of
proof is required to recover punitive damages under this bill than generally
is required in civil cases. The bill requires that "reckless disregard of the
manufacturer or product seller for the safety of product users, consumers,
or persons who might be harmed by the product" be established "by clear
and convincing evidence." '22 This standard appears to fall somewhere be-
tween the civil standard of the "preponderance of the evidence" and the
criminal standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 2 3 Senate bill 2631
states that a negligent choice among alternative product designs or warn-
ings, when made in the ordinary course of business, does not constitute,
by itself, reckless disregard."' The plaintiff must offer more than the
manufacturer's cost-benefit analysis resulting in its choice to use the less
safe method of production and marketing. Litigants and courts engaged in
cases brought under this statute would face the difficult task of determining
when the corporate choice leaves the realm of the "ordinary course of
business," and enters the area of "reckless disregard."
Procedurally, Senate bill 2631 adopts the approach of splitting the punitive
damage award functions between the judge and jury."' Under this approach,
the jury would determine whether punitive damages should be awarded. In
making this determination, it would consider the defendant's awareness of
the likelihood of serious harm, the conduct of the defendant upon discovery
that the product caused harm, the duration of any concealment of the harm
by the defendant, and whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.' 2 6
If the jury determined that punitive damages were appropriate, the judge
would assess the amount of those damages. The judge would consider all
the factors the jury had considered in making the award, plus the profitability
of the misconduct to the defendant, and the total effect of any prior punish-
ment imposed on the defendant for the same misconduct. As stated earlier,
an approach which divides responsibility between judge and jury is appeal-
ing for its ability to minimize punitive damages overkill, but it would not
completely eliminate the possibility of overkill,' 2 7 nor would it guarantee that
121. S. 2631, supra note 119, at § 13(A)(1). This section provides:
Punitive damages may be awarded to any claimant who establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the reckless disregard
of the manufacturer or product seller for the safety of product users, consumers,
or persons who might be harmed by the product. Punitive damages may not be
awarded in the absence of a compensatory award.
Id.
122. Id. at § 13(A)(2). This same standard of proof was incorporated into the Department
of Commerce's Model Uniform Product Liability Act. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,748 (1979).
123. This assumption is based on the definitions given by the Department of Commerce
to the Model Uniform Product Liability Act. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act, § 102,
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,748 (1979).
124. S. 2631, supra note 119, at § 13(B).
125. Id. at § 13(B)(1).
126. Id. at § 13(B)(2).
127. Id. Overkill is still possible because the approach does not limit the amount of the
final punitive damage award.
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the defendant manufacturer or seller would be punished adequately.
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS-AN ALTERNATIVE TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
In recent years, it has been maintained that rather than award punitive
damages in civil cases, criminal sanctions should be sought against manufac-
turers of unsafe products. This approach was taken recently in Indiana's
highly publicized Ford Pinto trial, 2 ' and is the subject matter of a congres-
sional bill.129 Although criminal sanctions cannot punish the corporate defen-
dant to the same monetary degree as punitive damages, 3 ° criminal sanctions
might deter and punish in other ways. For example, there are intangible
effects of a criminal conviction, such as stigma, damaged reputation, and
intense media coverage which often fail to accompany punitive damage
awards.' 3 ' If the amount of money and time spent by Ford in its defense
in the Indiana criminal case is any indication, corporate defendants are going
to take these intangible effects seriously.'32 Whether corporate defendants
128. Indiana v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324, slip op. (Elkhart Superior Ct. Feb. 2, 1979).
See generally L. STROBEL, REcKLEss HoimciDE (1980) (complete account of the Ford Pinto criminal
trial). The Ford Motor Company was indicted on three counts of reckless homicide as a result
of the deaths of three persons in a Ford Pinto. The victims' Pinto was hit in a rear-end colli-
sion, causing the gas tank to rupture; this allowed gasoline to leak into the passenger compart-
ment and resulted in an explosive fire. Evidence in the form of Ford Motor Company documents
indicated that Ford knew of the likelihood of gas tank rupture but decided against investing
more money to improve the Pinto design. Ford eventually was acquitted of all criminal charges.
129. H.R. 4973, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Introduced by Rep. George Miller (D. Cal.),
this bill would require corporate managers, officers, and directors to notify employees and
appropriate federal agencies of hazards in a product, or in an industrial process. Failure to
notify would carry a minimum sanction of $50,000 in fines and two years in prison for in-
dividuals, and a minimum of $100,000 in fines for a corporation. This bill is discussed in
Bodine, Prosecutors Undeterred by Pinto Acquittal; Defense Bar Says It's in the Driver's Seat
Now, Nat'l. L.J., Mar. 31, 1980, at 3, 17 [hereinafter cited as Bodine].
130. In the Ford Pinto criminal case, Ford faced a total criminal liability of $35,000, if
convicted on all three counts of reckless homicide. Compare this to Ford's liability in the Grim-
shaw civil case, in which Ford faced a punitive damage award of $3,500,000 (after being remit-
ted from the jury verdict of $127,000,000 in punitive damages). Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); see Mallor & Roberts, supra note 50, at
657-58. In Illinois, the maximum criminal fine for each count of involuntary manslaughter
or reckless homicide is $10,000. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-9-1 (1981).
131. The following articles note the intangible effects of criminal sanctions: Mallor & Roberts,
supra note 50, at 639; Comment, Corporate Homicide: The Stark Realities of Artificial Beings
and Legal Fictions, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 367 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Cor-
porate Homicide]; Comment, Criminal Safeguards, supra note 76, at 411; Note, Corporate
Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, A New Assault]. See also Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal
Sanctions, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 217 (1965) ("Businessmen abhor the idea of being branded
a criminal . . . ; [thus] the very fact that a criminal statute has been enacted by the legislature
is a powerful factor in the eyes of the potential actor, even where the actor disagrees with
the purpose of the law").
132. Ford reportedly spent $1,000,000 on its defense, compared to only $40,000 spent by
the prosecution. Tybor, How Ford Won the Pinto Trial, Nat'l. L.J., Mar. 24, 1980, 1, 12.
The deterrent effect of these intangibles has been criticized, however, as being dependent on
too many uncontrollable variables. These variables are factors external to the criminal pro-
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will adjust their manufacturing and marketing decisions as a result of a poten-
tial criminal prosecution, or merely attempt to discover ways to keep such
decisions from public view, remains to be seen.
There are several advantages to applying criminal sanctions to product
liability cases. Unlike civil litigation costs and punitive damage awards,
criminal fines and the costs of defending criminal prosecutions are not tax
deductible.' 33 This factor must be considered by a corporation when it engages
in cost-benefit analyses to determine manufacturing and marketing choices
because potential criminal sanctions represent an added cost. Thus, the deter-
rent effect of criminal sanctions is enhanced by making the idea of conduct
which might lead to the imposition of criminal sanctions less appealing.
There are additional advantages to be gained from imposition of criminal
sanctions that benefit both the manufacturer and the public. Since criminal
fines are generally smaller than punitive damage awards,"' the problem of
overkill would be eliminated. Before the risk of punitive damages overkill
could be eliminated, however, the general rule that punitive damages in civil
suits are not precluded by prior criminal punishment must be abolished.'"
Another advantage is that the proceeds from a criminal fine do not go to
an individual plaintiff as a windfall, but rather, go to the state.'3 6 The state
might use proceeds received from the successful prosecution of product lia-
bility cases to promote product safety or consumer awareness of hazardous
products.
The propriety of imposing criminal fines on public corporations has been
criticized, as have punitive damages, as being unfair punishment of inno-
cent shareholders lacking any adequate means of control over the corpora-
tion's decision-making process.' 37 As noted earlier,' 8 it has been questioned
ceedings, such as the amount of publicity, the accuracy of reporting, the public's knowledge
of which company manufactures the defendant's products, and the elasticity of demand for
the product involved. Wheeler, Manufacturers: Wrong Targets for Threat of Criminal Sanc-
tions?, Nat'l. L.J., Dec. 22, 1980, 24, 26.
133. See Note, The Tax Consequences of a Punitive Damages Award, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
909 (1980). Judgments and litigation costs may not be deducted from taxable income only when
they arise from a criminal conviction. Id. at 920. If the amount Ford spent to defend itself
in the Pinto criminal case is an indication of what the average might be, these costs could
be a strong deterrent in themselves.
134. For a discussion of Ford's potential criminal, as compared to civil, liability, see supra
note 130.
135. Comment, Criminal Safeguards, supra note 76, at 414-15. Only three jurisdictions bar
punitive damage awards when the defendant also can be held liable for criminal sanctions:
District of Columbia (Huber v. Teuber, 10 D.C. (3 MacArth.) 484 (1879)), Indiana (Taber
v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 332 (1854)), and New Hampshire (Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872)). Il-
linois does not bar punitive damages when a defendant faces potential criminal liability. Bran-
non v. Silvernail, 81 IIU. 434 (1876).
136. In Illinois, the State's Attorney's Office collects all criminal fines and transfers them
to the county treasurer for use in the county's general corporate fund. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
53, § 18a (1981).
137. See Note, A New Assault, supra note 131, at 921.
138. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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whether shareholders are really "innocent," insofar as they impliedly con-
sent to any misconduct by seeking a return on their investment.' 39 Further-
more, the impact of criminal liability on shareholders may be minimized
in two ways: shareholder losses are limited to the amount of the individual's
investment, which the shareholder must be considered to have risked will-
ingly, and shareholders may not feel any loss if the state chooses to pro-
secute the directors with threat of their imprisonment, rather than with a
fine against the corporation.' 0
It should be noted that there are conceptual and semantic problems in-
volved in indicting corporations.' 4 ' Many statutes define the perpetrator of
a homicide as a "person." This definition creates few problems, as many
jurisdictions classify a corporation as a "person." A homicide victim,
however, is often defined as "another human being"; it is this definition
which creates semantic problems in prosecuting a corporation for homicide.
It has been argued that by defining the victim as "another human being,"
the legislature implicitly has required that the perpetrator must also be a
"human being," which is different from a "person."'4 2 The counter argu-
ment often expressed is that the reference to "another human being" simply
demonstrates the legislature's intention to prevent prosecution for attempted
suicide. "
The Illinois Criminal Code'" has been interpreted as providing for the
indictment of a corporation for involuntary manslaughter. '4  Nevertheless,
it will be a difficult task for a prosecutor to obtain an indictment and con-
viction of a corporation for homicide in the products liability context, as
evidenced by the acquittal of Ford in the Indiana Pinto case. Yet, a survey
of prosecutors conducted after the Pinto case revealed that most prosecutors
were undeterred by Ford's acquittal,'4 6 and will continue to prosecute cor-
porations for homicide as circumstances warrant. Thus, the imposition of
criminal sanctions against a corporation for its misconduct in marketing a
hazardous product may soon be a widespread alternative to the imposition
of punitive damages in a civil case.
139. See Comment, Corporate Homicide, supra note 131, at 405.
140. Id. at 405-06.
141. See Maakestad, A Historical Survey of Corporate Homicide in the United States: Could
it be Prosecuted in Illinois?, 69 ILL. B.J. 772, 776-79 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Maakestad];
Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Controversy Flames Anew, 17 CAL.
W.L. REV. 465, 467-82 (1981); Comment, Corporate Homicide, supra note 131, at 394-404;
Note, A New Assault, supra note 131, at 912-13.
142. Ford used this argument in the Pinto criminal case. See Note, A New Assault, supra
note 131, at 919-20. The difference between "human being" and "person" is that the latter
generally includes corporations, while the former is generally someone who is born and alive.
143. The prosecution used this argument in the Ford Pinto case. See Note, A New Assault,
supra note 131, at 920.
144. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-1 to 1008-6-1 (1981).
145. See Maakestad, supra note 141, at 779 (this interpretation is based on the definitional
section of the Criminal Code).
146. See Bodine, supra note 129, at 3 (the prosecutors interviewed said that in the proper
factual setting they would prosecute a corporation for homicide).
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OPTIONS BEFORE THE ILLINOIS COURTS
The best approach Illinois courts could adopt to control the award of
punitive damages in products liability/mass tort situations lies in a combina-
tion of the suggested approaches. The approach adopted should maintain
the flexibility required to deal with defendants of varying size, power, and
wealth in the products liability context. A more precise definition of when
punitive damages are to be assessed in products cases, perhaps the "flagrant
indifference" definition as adopted in Moore v. Remington Arms Co.,' 47
should be initiated for statewide use. If the chosen definition were com-
bined with a higher burden of proof, such as the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard,' 8 the awarding of punitive damages would be limited
to those cases in which the defendant's misconduct is truly outrageous. The
determination of whether, and in what amount, punitive damages should
be awarded, should remain with the jury so that the public may demonstrate
its attitude toward the defendant's misconduct. Since defendants in products
cases are businesses, the maintenance of this arena for the demonstration
of public attitude may be one of the strongest deterrents against future abuses.
The utilization of a more precise definition and a higher burden of proof,
along with the traditional judicial controls of remittitur and vacation, should
protect defendants from punitive damages overkill while maintaining the flex-
ibility needed for any products liability punitive damages standard. Increas-
ing use of criminal sanctions, such as reckless homicide, should also be con-
sidered by the Illinois legislature as an alternative to punitive damages when
appropriate. The use of criminal sanctions might deter in situations where
punitive damages could not, such as when a defendant is wealthy enough
to survive punitive awards, but might succumb to the intangible effects of
criminal sanctions. Furthermore, the use of criminal sanctions would eliminate
the problem of plaintiffs receiving so-called windfalls. A combination of
judicial controls in the assessment of punitive damages, and legislation in
the use of criminal sanctions as an alternative, would provide Illinois with
a comprehensive scheme for the control of punitive damages in products
liability/mass tort situations.' 9
CONCLUSION
The Froud decision, if affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, reverses
over one hundred years of case law prohibiting the recovery of punitive
damages in a personal injury action brought under the Illinois Survival Act.
147. 100 111. App. 3d 1102, 1115, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (4th Dist. 1981).
148. S. 2631, supra note 119, at § 13(A)(2).
149. Perhaps criminal sanctions could replace civil judgments of punitive damages when the
defendant's misconduct resulted in death. In that event, the criminal justice system would enter,
as it would in any homicide, to determine whether to prosecute. The decedent's survivors would
retain a civil remedy under the Wrongful Death Act, but would not be permitted to recover
punitive damages.
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The impact of Froud's expansion of the availability of punitive damages
recovery may be profound, particularly in mass tort situations. The Illinois
Supreme Court and the Illinois General Assembly will need to address the
problems created by an expansion of punitive damages recovery by instituting
a system for the control of punitive damage awards. There are several
approaches for control within the civil system that Illinois may adopt. Alter-
natively, it may attempt to achieve the goals of punitive damages through
the criminal law. Whether the state adopts one of the approaches outlined
above, or another approach, this much is clear: Illinois has the opportunity
to be in the vanguard by allowing punitive damages recovery under its Sur-
vival Act, and by instituting a uniform system for the control of that
recovery.*
Ann Gillespie Pietrick
*Just prior to publication of this Note, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court in Froud v. Celotex Corp. Froud v. Celotex Corp., Nos. 57087, 57088, 57089 (11. Oct.
25, 1983). The supreme court based its decision on statutory interpretation and stare decisis.
This Note focuses primarily on the public and judicial policy issues surrounding the awarding
of punitive damages in products liability/mass tort situations. Therefore, since the Illinois Supreme
Court chose not to address these issues in its opinion, the content of this Note remains unaf-
fected by the reversal of Froud.-Ed.
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